Barriers and Enablers to Using an Emergency Operations Center in Public Health Emergency Management: A Scoping Review.

OBJECTIVES: The aim of this study was to review the role of public health emergency operations centers in recent public health emergencies and to identify the barriers and enablers influencing the effective use of a public health emergency operations center (PHEOC) in public health emergency management. METHODS: A systematic search was conducted in 5 databases and selected grey literature websites. RESULTS: Forty-two articles, consisting of 28 peer-reviewed studies and 14 grey literature sources matched the inclusion criteria. Results suggest that PHEOCs are used to prepare and respond to a range of public health emergencies, including coronavirus disease (COVID-19). Factors found to influence the use of a PHEOC include the adoption of an incident management system, internal and external communications, data management, workforce capacity, and physical infrastructure. CONCLUSIONS: PHEOCs play an important role in public health emergency management. This review identified several barriers and enablers to using a PHEOC in public health emergency management. Future research should focus on addressing the barriers to using a PHEOC and looking at ways to evaluate the impact of using a PHEOC on public health emergency outcomes.

Tracking COVID-19 Inequities Across Jurisdictions Represented in the Big Cities Health Coalition (BCHC): The COVID-19 Health Inequities in BCHC Cities Dashboard.

Objectives. To describe the creation of an interactive dashboard to advance the understanding of the COVID-19 pandemic from an equity and urban health perspective across 30 large US cities that are members of the Big Cities Health Coalition (BCHC). Methods. We leveraged the Drexel‒BCHC partnership to define the objectives and audience for the dashboard and developed an equity framework to conceptualize COVID-19 inequities across social groups, neighborhoods, and cities. We compiled data on COVID-19 trends and inequities by race/ethnicity, neighborhood, and city, along with neighborhood- and city-level demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, and built an interactive dashboard and Web platform to allow interactive comparisons of these inequities across cities. Results. We launched the dashboard on January 21, 2021, and conducted several dissemination activities. As of September 2021, the dashboard included data on COVID-19 trends for the 30 cities, on inequities by race/ethnicity in 21 cities, and on inequities by neighborhood in 15 cities. Conclusions. This dashboard allows public health practitioners to contextualize racial/ethnic and spatial inequities in COVID-19 across large US cities, providing valuable insights for policymakers. (Am J Public Health. 2022;112(6):904-912. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2021.306708).

Hindsight is 2020? Lessons in global health governance one year into the pandemic.

Fourteen months into the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, we identify key lessons in the global and national responses to the pandemic. The World Health Organization has played a pivotal technical, normative and coordinating role, but has been constrained by its lack of authority over sovereign member states. Many governments also mistakenly attempted to manage COVID-19 like influenza, resulting in repeated lockdowns, high excess morbidity and mortality, and poor economic recovery. Despite the incredible speed of the development and approval of effective and safe vaccines, the emergence of new SARS-CoV-2 variants means that all countries will have to rely on a globally coordinated public health effort for several years to defeat this pandemic.

The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic: the race to trace: contact tracing scale-up in San Francisco-early lessons learned.

In order to effectively control spread of coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19), it is essential that jurisdictions have the capacity to rapidly trace close contacts of each and every case. Best practice guidance on how to implement such programs is urgently needed. We describe the early experience in the City and County of San Francisco (CCSF), where the City's Department of Health expanded contact tracing capability in anticipation of changes in San Francisco's 'shelter in place' order between April and June 2020. Important prerequisites to successful scale-up included a rapid expansion of the COVID-19 response workforce, expansion of testing capability, and other containment resources. San Francisco's scale-up offers a model for how other jurisdictions can rapidly mobilize a workforce. We underscore the importance of an efficient digital case management system, effective training, and expansion of supportive service programs for those in quarantine or isolation, and metrics to ensure continuous performance improvement.

[Interrupting the chains of transmission of COVID-19 in Italy: survey among the Prevention Departments]. / Interrompere le catene di trasmissione di COVID-19 in Italia: indagine tra i Dipartimenti di prevenzione.

BACKGROUND: the ability to implement effective preventive and control measures is rooted in public health surveillance to promptly identify and isolate contagious patients. OBJECTIVES: to describe some organizational aspects and resources involved in the control of COVID-19 pandemic. DESIGN: observational cross sectional study. SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS: a survey of methods and tools adopted by the competent service (Prevention department) in the Local public health units (LHU) of the regional Health services has been performed in May 2020. The survey collected data related to activities carried out during the month of April 2020 on the surveillance system for collection of suspected cases, their virological ascertainment, the isolation procedures and contact-tracing activities by means of an online questionnaire filled in by the public health structure of the regional health system. A convenience sample of Prevention departments was recruited. RESULTS: in 44 Prevention departments of 14 Regions/Autonomous Provinces (caring for 40% of the population residing in Italy), different services were swiftly engaged in pandemic response. Reports of suspected cases were about 3 times the number of confirmed cases in the same month. Local reporting form was used in 46% of the LHUs while a regional form was available in 42% of the Departments (in 9/14 Regions). In one fourth the forms were not always used and 2% had no forms for the reporting of suspected cases. Data were recorded in 52% of LHUs on local databases, while in 20% a regional database (in 7 Regions) had been created. A proportion of 11% did not record the data for further elaboration. The virological assessment with nasopharyngeal swabs out of the hospital setting was carried out on the average in 7 points in each LHU (median 5) and the average daily capacity was 350 (71 per 100,000) swabs. The rate of subjects newly tested during the month of April was of 893 per 100,000 new people. Data collected at the swabbing were recorded on a regional platform in 17 LHUs (39%) of 8 Regions. In 7% LHUs only positive specimens were recorded electronically. Local files were used in 27% LHUs. The interview with confirmed cases was carried out with a local questionnaire in 52% LHUs, while 14% stated that a standardized form was not used. The data collected about cases were recorded on a regional IT platform in 30% Departments (in 8 Regions) and in 41% data were registered only locally. For each confirmed case in April, a median of 4 contacts were identified. Only 13 (30%) Departments in 9 Regions have registered contact data on a regional database. Ten Departments (23%) have only hard copies, while 56% recorded data on local databases. About 5 health professionals for 100,000 resident population were involved in each LHU in each of the following activities as receiving reports of suspected cases, swabs collection, interviews of cases and contact identifications. CONCLUSIONS: the pandemic required rapidly a great organizational effort and great flexibility to increase response capacity, which now must be strengthened and maintained. Several different tools (forms and electronic files) have been developed in each LHU and used for the same surveillance operational processes with a loss in local efficiency. The inhomogeneous data collection and recording is an obstacle for further analyses and risk identifications and is a missed opportunity for the advancement of our knowledge on pandemic epidemiology analysis. In Italy, updating the pandemic response plans is the priority, at national, regional and local level, and the occasion to fill the gaps and to improve surveillance systems to the interruption of COVID-19 transmission.

A Public Health Laboratory Response to the Pandemic.

An outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by a novel coronavirus (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 [SARS-CoV-2]) began in Wuhan, Hubei, China, in December 2019 and spread rapidly worldwide. The response by the Alberta Precision Laboratories, Public Health Laboratory (ProvLab), AB, Canada, included the development and implementation of nucleic acid detection-based assays and dynamic changes in testing protocols for the identification of cases as the epidemic curve increased exponentially. This rapid response was essential to slow down and contain transmission and provide valuable time to the local health authorities to prepare appropriate response strategies. As of May 24, 2020, 236,077 specimens were tested, with 6,475 (2.74%) positives detected in the province of Alberta, Canada. Several commercial assays are now available; however, the response from commercial vendors to develop and market validated tests is a time-consuming process. In addition, the massive global demand made it difficult to secure a reliable commercial supply of testing kits and reagents. A public health laboratory serves a unique and important role in the delivery of health care. One of its functions is to anticipate and prepare for novel emerging pathogens with a plan for pandemic preparedness. Here, we outline the response that involved the development and deployment of testing methodologies that evolved as SARS-CoV-2 spread worldwide, the challenges encountered, and mitigation strategies. We also provide insight into the organizational structure of how a public health response is coordinated in Alberta, Canada, and its benefits.

Implementing the Health Early Warning System based on syndromic and event-based surveillance at the 2019 Hajj.

BACKGROUND: During the 2019 Hajj, the Ministry of Health in Saudi Arabia implemented for the first time a health early warning system for rapid detection and response to health threats. AIMS: This study aimed to describe the early warning findings at the Hajj to highlight the pattern of health risks and the potential benefits of the disease surveillance system. METHODS: Using syndromic surveillance and event-based surveillance data, the health early warning system generated automated alarms for public health events, triggered alerts for rapid epidemiological investigations and facilitated the monitoring of health events. RESULTS: During the deployment period (4 July-31 August 2019), a total of 121 automated alarms were generated, of which 2 events (heat-related illnesses and injuries/trauma) were confirmed by the response teams. CONCLUSION: The surveillance system potentially improved the timeliness and situational awareness for health events, including non-infectious threats. In the context of the current COVID-19 pandemic, a health early warning system could enhance case detection and facilitate monitoring of the disease geographical spread and the effectiveness of control measures.

Mobilizing a Whole Community: Policy and Strategy Implications of an Integrated Local System Response to a Global Health Crisis.

The East Toronto Health Partners (ETHP) include more than 50 organizations working collaboratively to create an integrated system of care in the east end of Toronto. This existing partnership proved invaluable as a platform for a rapid, coordinated local response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Months after the first wave of the pandemic began, with the daily numbers of COVID-19 cases finally starting to decline, leaders from ETHP provided preliminary reflections on two critical questions: (1) How were existing integration efforts leveraged to mobilize a response during the COVID-19 crisis? and (2) How can the response to the initial wave of COVID-19 be leveraged to further accelerate integration and better address subsequent waves and system improvements once the pandemic abates?

Superposition of COVID-19 waves, anticipating a sustained wave, and lessons for the future.

The 2019 coronavirus (COVID-19), also known as SARS-CoV-2, is highly pathogenic and virulent, and it spreads very quickly through human-to-human contact. In response to the growing number of cases, governments across the spectrum of affected countries have adopted different strategies in implementing control measures, in a hope to reduce the number of new cases. However, 5 months after the first confirmed case, countries like the United States of America (US) seems to be heading towards a trajectory that indicates a health care crisis. This is in stark contrast to the downward trajectory in Europe, China, and elsewhere in Asia, where the number of new cases has seen a decline ahead of an anticipated second wave. A data-driven approach reveals three key strategies in tackling COVID-19. Our work here has definitively evaluated these strategies and serves as a warning to the US, and more importantly, a guide for tackling future pandemics. Also see the video abstract here https://youtu.be/gPkCi2_7tWo.